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In the path-breaking book published in 1978, Man-Made Disasters, the sociologist 
Barry Turner questioned the limits to an engineer’s expertise when faced with 
explaining the causes of socio-technological failure. Whilst engineers benefited from 
having technical skills with which they could account for engineering failure, they 
were more likely to find fault with external environmental and organisational factors 
that were outside their control, rather than identify deficiencies with their own 
specialised knowledge-base and skills-set.1 Two decades later, after Turner’s death, 
the book was re-issued with an additional chapter by Nicholas Pidgeon. Turner and 
Pidgeon established the consensus that, rather than being ‘bolts from the blue’, socio-
technological disasters (as ‘man-made’ disasters will be referred to in this article) are 
complex events, the product of long incubation periods, during which ‘failures of 
foresight’ develop based on erroneous assumptions, misinformation or 
misunderstandings within large organisations. Disasters, they argued, are the outcome 
of a lack of knowledge, mistakes made by engineers and other interested parties, and 
the failure to act upon early signals of failure. They are the product of social, 
organisational and technical practices; they also reveal longstanding technological and 
administrative deficiencies within large organisations’ safety cultures. Moreover, such 
events are subsequently subjected to intensive scrutiny by administrative, technical 
and political actors, from both local and central government.2  
Given the long-standing influence of Turner’s work within the field of disaster 
studies, it is surprising that comparatively few historians have explained the causes of 
                                                 
1 B.M. Turner, Man-Made Disasters, London, 1978, 31. 
2 B.A. Turner and N. Pidgeon, Man-made Disasters, Oxford 1997. See also S. 
Gherardi, Man-made disasters twenty years later: critical commentary, Health, Risk & 
Society, 1 (1999), 233-239. 
2 
socio-technological disasters through recourse to his classic study. The overwhelming 
majority of research has been published in specialised journals devoted to the study of 
disasters, crises and emergencies: history only really exists here as a backdrop to 
reveal ‘a prior, more fortunate time, when foresight, prudence, good behavior or 
divine grace might have unscrolled history toward a happier conclusion.’3 One or two 
exceptions exist: for example, E. L. Quarantelli, Patrick Lagadec and Arjen Boin have 
shown how historical studies reveal changing social interpretations of disaster, as well 
as cultural differences in coping with everyday disaster, but they remain concerned 
with explaining the emergence of systematic disaster research as a recent 
phenomenon.4  
This historiographical blindness to Turner is largely reflected by the historical 
field’s focus on post-disaster reconstruction and re-planning.5 It is also the product of 
an eclectic and varied global interest in disasters from multiple sub-fields: urban and 
environmental history, the history of technology, science, technology and society 
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studies, planning history, and, more recently, cultural history.6 Whilst one can 
celebrate the multi-disciplinarity of the field, the history of disasters lacks a 
disciplinary centre, which has inevitably generated a fragmented approach towards 
historical analysis. 
In nineteenth-century Britain, civil engineering was an evolving field of 
technical knowledge and professional practice contingent on the diffusion of shared 
cultural beliefs through an associational network. Engineering knowledge evolved 
through practice, which included learning from mistakes made on the ground. The 
only really effective way that such knowledge could be shared more widely was 
through national associations of professionals, such as the Institute of Civil Engineers 
(ICE), founded in 1818, and the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (IME), 
established in 1847, which organised lectures and published proceedings for wider 
dissemination. With increasing specialisation, new fields emerged, each with their 
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own knowledge, approaches and institutions, which inevitably meant that the 
profession lacked a single coherent voice.7 
Nowhere was the quest for professional expertise more evident than in the 
field of nineteenth-century British waterworks design. In their pursuit of ever larger 
supplies of potable water, private companies and municipal authorities extended their 
urban footprints ever further into the surrounding countryside. Public health crises, 
marked by outbreaks of cholera and other water-borne diseases, were an inevitable 
consequence of the unprecedented growth of industrial towns during the first-half of 
the nineteenth century. Waterworks were consequently built to provide a regular 
supply of clean water for commercial, industrial and residential consumers. Moreover, 
since the provision and management of waterworks was integral to the successful 
functioning of the urban economy, the supply of water had to be regulated and 
serviced by large organisations. These included joint-stock companies, quasi-elected 
property-owning oligarchies, and a small but growing number of elected municipal 
water departments, all of which drew upon an increasingly specialised external labour 
pool to design the plans and engineer the works.8 
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This paper is the first to integrate the historical scholarship on Victorian urban 
water supplies with the sociology of disasters, in order to scrutinise the ways that 
socio-technological disasters challenge existing professional expertise and culture. It 
continues a well-established trend in the history of technology literature to assess the 
value of technological change through detailed empirical analysis.9 Two major 
reservoir failures in mid-nineteenth-century urban-industrial Britain – the Bilberry 
Reservoir above Holmfirth, near Huddersfield, in West Yorkshire (1852), and the 
Dale Dyke Reservoir at Low Bradfield, up-river from Sheffield in South Yorkshire 
(1864) – involving high human casualties, brought the engineering profession into 
dispute in explaining systemic failures in waterworks technology. Engineers debated 
whether such events were the product of poor engineering, defective management or 
natural causes. Evolving knowledge formed the bedrock for such contestations, which 
took place in various professional and public arenas. By focusing on the relationships 
between different experts during these two cases, this paper argues that the creation 
and dissemination of expertise occurred on contested terrain. It draws upon extensive 
archival research into the records of the waterworks’ proprietors, local and central 
government, as well as the media. In so doing, it contributes to growing scholarly 
interest in the history of professional experts as members of an elite group responsible 
for the control and management of the environment and its resources.  
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A tale of two floods 
The Holmfirth and Sheffield floods occurred twelve years and roughly twenty miles 
apart, but they shared important similarities in their design, construction and operation, 
as well as the public’s reaction to their failure. Both involved the collapse of 
commercially-designed and legally-sanctioned earthfill embankment reservoirs, 
which remained a popular style of reservoir construction into the second-half of the 
nineteenth century despite growing safety concerns. Although they were subject to 
cracking and subsidence, they remained popular on grounds of cost and because they 
constituted an agreed type of ‘working knowledge’ following years of practice. As 
John Pickstone has shown, technological and scientific decision-making was 
invariably based on available knowledge, which was derived from a combination of 
observational and interventional methods: since the latter was, in the mid nineteenth 
century, an expensive and risky option for contracted engineers, they preferred to 
follow existing methods rather than experiment with alternative building materials 
like concrete and stone.10 
As Christopher Hamlin and Anthony Wohl have shown in relation to 
Victorian public health improvements, local elites invariably based their decisions 
about infrastructural investment on a combination of incomplete and evolving 
technical knowledge, weighed down by the financial burden imposed by rate-payers, 
                                                 
10 N. Smith, A History of Dams, London, 1971, 171-181, 212-225; J.V. Pickstone, 
Working knowledges before and after circa 1800: practices and disciplines in the 
history of science, technology and medicine, Isis, 98 (2007), 489-516; J.V. Pickstone, 
A brief introduction to ways of knowing and ways of working, History of Science, 49 
(2011), 235-245. 
7 
which inevitably meant that the less risky option was usually opted for.11 
Technological decision-making was similarly constrained by evolving scientific 
knowledge about bacteriology and disease prevention: for instance, studies by Hamlin 
and Werner Troesken have traced changes to knowledge about the harmful 
environmental effects of lead pipes in local water systems during the late nineteenth 
century. Sheffield was a notable case of a city suffering from an epidemic of lead-
poisoning in the 1880s and 1890s; despite the availability of fairly conclusive 
evidence, however, its political leaders were ‘not certain that the lead poisoning was 
really due to the water.’12 Commercial organisations such as waterworks companies 
were also constrained by the available knowledge at their disposal.13 Thus, the 
immediate relevance of Turner’s model is discernible; the adherence to an inherently 
defective method of construction was the product of evolving specialist engineering 
knowledge. It also reflected the centrality of financial factors to an organisation’s 
safety culture during a period of heavy capital investment, a point similarly noted by 
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Eda Kranakis in her study of organisational failures leading up to the collapse of the 
Quebec Bridge in 1907.14 
Bilberry Reservoir was constructed in the Holme Valley in West Yorkshire, 
approximately ten miles south of the textiles town of Huddersfield, roughly thirty 
miles south-west of Leeds, and three miles south-west of and above Holmfirth, a 
small cloth town of around 5,000 inhabitants. Holmfirth was situated at the bottom of 
the valley at the confluence of the Holme and Ribbleden rivulets, and was described 
by White’s Directory as a growing town with a thriving associational culture built 
around the local mechanics’ institute.15 Dale Dyke Reservoir was built in the Loxley 
Valley, some eight miles north-west of the thriving steel town of Sheffield in South 
Yorkshire and above the manufacturing village of Low Bradfield with its water-
powered industries.16 Both reservoirs specifically provided water for commercial 
customers: the former supplied the water mills located along the River Holme; the 
latter offered compensation water to the cloth mills situated along the river Loxley in 
anticipation of further reservoirs being constructed in the valley to supply Sheffield’s 
rapidly growing population. 
The Bilberry Reservoir was to be one of three service reservoirs constructed 
by the HRC, which was, by an 1837 Act, constituted by a group of millowners and 
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other property-owners.17 Dale Dyke Reservoir was the venture of the SWWC, which 
had been incorporated in 1830 to supply water for commercial and domestic purposes 
by tapping the springs and rivers in the neighbouring Redmires and Rivelin valleys. 
Its directors and shareholders were largely drawn from the town’s elite, or were major 
landowners across South Yorkshire; similarly, the HRC was dominated by mill-
owners and manufacturers in the immediate vicinity of the town. The Loxley valley 
was added to the SWWC’s portfolio in 1853, by an Act with powers to construct three 
new reservoirs – Dale Dyke, Strines and Agden – along with connecting aqueducts 
and tunnels to transport the water into town.18 Both ventures were ambitious for their 
time and illustrate how water from the northern uplands was seen in terms of its 
serviceability, as a resource to be collected, impounded, distributed and sold to thirsty 
urban populations who relied upon it for energy and nutrients.19 
 
INSERT FIGS 1 AND 2 HERE 
 
Both floods were major events across the Yorkshire region, as well as 
nationwide. The Bilberry flood was, argues Harold Platt, ‘the first human-made 
‘natural’ disaster in the modern era to achieve the status of a national tragedy,’ whilst 
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James Winter describes the Dale Dyke’s failure as ‘the greatest single ‘natural’ 
catastrophe of the century’ in Britain.20 They therefore illustrate the interdependence 
of human and natural forces in producing what Christian Pfister has recently called 
‘nature-induced disasters’.21 They attracted intense media scrutiny from newspapers 
and periodicals, and evoked considerable public sympathy through organised relief 
efforts by charitable groups, local government and wealthy individuals across the 
country. Paintings, poems and stories were produced to raise money for the relief 
effort, whilst organised excursions – by road to Holmfirth and by rail to Sheffield – 
were put on to satiate the public’s morbid fascination with death and destruction.22 
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Statistically, the Sheffield flood trumped Holmfirth. Officially, 250 people 
drowned in Sheffield, as against 81 at Holmfirth, although a local historian has since 
calculated the death toll at Sheffield, including deaths through debilitating illnesses 
caused by deep water immersion, at 306.23 Property destruction was widespread in 
both cases: in Sheffield, 31 factories, mills or workshops were destroyed, 55 more 
were partially destroyed or damaged, and 237 were flooded; in the Holme Valley, 14 
mills or dye-houses were destroyed, 22 more were seriously damaged along with 44 
large shops and two iron foundries. Some 800 houses in Sheffield and the Loxley 
valley were destroyed or abandoned, and a further 4,357 flooded; in the Holme valley 
34 houses were completely destroyed with serious damage caused to 139 more. 
Bridges, churches, roads and public houses were wiped out by the fast moving flood 
waters in both towns.24 In the immediate aftermath, unemployment was rife across 
both districts, but was more acutely felt in the Holme Valley, which was entirely 
dependent upon the mills: the Holmfirth Flood Relief Fund recorded some 4,986 
adults and 2,142 children unemployed; workers also had their tools washed away.25 
Yet statistics alone do not tell us much about the extent of socio-technological 
disasters and their wider social, cultural and political impacts, not least the limitations 
of expert engineering knowledge, to which this paper turns.  
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Engineering expertise 
The Holmfirth and Sheffield floods reveal two types of professional experts within the 
civil engineering profession in the mid nineteenth century. First were the internal 
experts; those engineers who enjoyed what Harry Collins and Robert Evans call 
‘interactional expertise’, in that they had been commissioned by the waterworks’ 
proprietors to design, build, supervise and manage the reservoirs that subsequently 
failed. These engineers derived their expertise from their interactions with working 
technologies on the ground; they were able to draw on their working experience as 
evidence of their expertise. Whilst, then, internal experts could point to their 
individual record as testimony of their expertise, in practice expertise was a collective 
form of identity located in the ‘social group’ of engineers with their shared language, 
working practices and professional status.26 
The second group were the external experts; a small cadre of engineers who 
were instructed, either by central government or local parties, to intervene in the 
deliberations about the alleged causes of the engineering failure. These men enjoyed 
‘contributory expertise’; their knowledge was derived from their scrutiny of the socio-
technologies, but they were never intimately involved with the schemes. As such, 
these men were more likely to refer to their theoretical knowledge and understanding 
of technology, rather than draw upon their working knowledge; their interaction was 
more intermittent than that of the interactional expert.27 Together, the two expert 
groups’ deliberations took place in a variety of public arenas, starting in the disaster 
zone itself where engineers, journalists, the coroner, and the voyeuristic public visited 
and observed; the devastated remains of the reservoirs were duly transformed into 
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‘field sites’ through which the reasons for failure could be identified and disputed. In 
this sense, to paraphrase Thomas Gieryn, the disaster site became a ‘truth-spot’ in 
which a variety of knowledge claims about the safety of the site were produced and 
challenged.28 
Following on from the observations made of both reservoirs, the deliberations 
shifted into the coroner’s court, before moving onto the town hall, boardroom and the 
House of Lords, where the Select Committee on Private Bills sanctioned the two 
organisations’ respective bills to rebuild the breached dams. They were also reported 
at length in local and national newspapers, alongside editorial commentaries and 
correspondence from interested parties. Whereas the internal experts’ interests were 
inextricably bound up with the public disputes over the explanations for the failure, 
which inevitably emphasised the subjectivity of their expertise, the external experts, 
particularly the government inspectors, were depicted as disinterested observers 
whose role was to objectively assess the facts of the case in order to make a balanced 
judgment on the causes of failure. 
In both cases, there was little noteworthy criticism or questioning of the 
consulting engineers responsible for the two reservoirs in the lead up to the accidents. 
Although problems were identified during construction, the reputations of the two 
engineers involved – George Leather, who was responsible for Bilberry Reservoir, 
and his nephew, John Towlerton Leather, who designed Dale Dyke – outweighed any 
efforts to scrutinise their involvement in either. Both men followed a common career 
trajectory to nineteenth-century engineering, acquiring ‘on-the-job’ expertise, firstly, 
through apprenticeship and, secondly, by pursuing independent practices. George’s 
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earlier works in bridging rivers and in designing the port of Goole for the Aire and 
Calder Navigation Authority brought him notoriety, and he had, since 1837, been 
engaged with his son, John Wignall, as consulting engineer to the Leeds Waterworks 
Company in West Yorkshire, an industrial town with a severe water problem owing to 
high mortality from cholera.29  
His ability to deliver on time and delegate responsibility made George an 
attractive prospect to the cash-strapped HRC, which offered his firm the contract to 
build three reservoirs outside Holmfirth in June 1838. Indeed, the initial contract 
specified that the HRC would appoint a resident surveyor or overlooker to work under 
his supervision. Inevitably, this meant that he would ‘only be required to come over 
now & then as circumstances might require,’ thereby minimising the costs of a three-
day round-trip of over sixty miles.30 Having agreed to the role, Leather interpreted the 
HRC’s specifications liberally, and did not even visit the site within the first two years 
of taking the contract; nor did he visit the works after September 1844 from whence 
he ceased his involvement with the works because he had taken on new projects.31 
The seeds of disaster were inevitably sown through lax supervision and administrative 
regulation within the HRC’s own organisational safety culture, which served to 
reinforce Leather’s self-belief that he could oversee safe construction ‘in abstentia’. 
John Towlerton Leather, the eldest son of George’s colliery-owning brother 
James, served his apprenticeship with his uncle before specialising in waterworks. He 
subsequently set up practice in Sheffield, whereupon he was appointed as managing 
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clerk, resident agent and surveyor for the SWWC in 1830, soon adding engineer to his 
portfolio of titles.32 With these varied job titles, Leather was regarded as a generalist 
rather than a specialist by his new employers. Yet he was integral in overseeing the 
Company’s early watershed expansion, drawing praise from his employers for his 
skill in building its first reservoir.33 He also continued to act as the consulting 
engineer after 1839, designing the Company’s works in the mid-1840s and ‘50s, 
which were executed by his successor in residence, John Gunson.34 By this time, his 
energies had shifted towards railway and waterways engineering, and he was heavily 
involved with the River Nene improvement works during the mid-1850s and ‘60s 
while construction of Dale Dyke was underway.35 This is significant because Turner 
cites the importance of the changing roles of key individuals and administrative 
bodies as a mitigating factor in failing to identify impending disasters because it leads 
to a breakdown in the availability of up-to-date information. Both Leathers, in shifting 
their attentions to new projects in other parts of the country, inevitably contributed 
towards socio-technological failure because they did not have control over the 
construction process. There was, then, a disjuncture between the design and 
construction phases when it might have been expected for there to have been a stricter 
sharing of responsibility.36 
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Building on Turner’s work, Charles Perrow writes that the connection between 
construction and operational difficulties produces ‘tightly coupled’ risks that offer no 
simple explanations for failure. Large-scale urban-industrial works like reservoirs are 
subject to many trivial failures that are normally the product of insufficient or 
incorrect information, which is subsequently rectified when the event is studied and 
produces a lesson. Whilst, then, the Leathers were pivotal actors in both cases, they 
cannot be singled out as the sole reasons for failure in either. Their diminishing 
involvement in the construction stage was an accepted cultural practice amongst 
waterworks proprietors, which partly explains the lax administrative and supervisory 
regulation. Perrow further explains how an organisation normally employs one 
engineer only to supervise the construction of a plant, whilst the contractors are 
trusted to ‘monitor themselves’. Inevitably, then, ‘[s]hoddy construction and 
inadvertent errors … are part and parcel of industrial life.’37 
The history of technology and environmental history literatures confirm this 
complexity.38 Engineers enjoyed parlous relationships with their projects: some were 
publicly commemorated with statues and plaques; others were rewarded for their 
longstanding professional service with the highest accolades available within their 
fields; others still were simply forgotten, written out of history, or subject to public 
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derision for their mistakes.39 As Perrow notes, engineers were expected to monitor 
themselves, which meant that they were less likely to identify or satisfactorily rectify 
problems, not least because they guaranteed to deliver the project on time and to 
budget. Moreover, both men delegated responsibility for on-site supervision: at 
Holmfirth this involved the overlookers, a small body of on-site officials appointed by 
the HRC, who kept Leather informed via his inexperienced assistant; meanwhile, at 
Sheffield on-site responsibility rested with Gunson, albeit via a closer relationship 
with the consulting engineer through direct channels of communication.40 
Whilst delegation itself was not a satisfactory explanation for the failures, the 
absence of supervisory checks and clear channels of communication – especially at 
Holmfirth – meant that the engineer could pass the blame onto other parties by 
rejecting responsibility and, further, by claiming misinformation about on-site 
problems. Pidgeon and O’Leary identify the blame culture that dominates post-
disaster reconstruction as a significant barrier to organisational learning; it also, as 
Kranakis demonstrates, allows the main political actors to sidestep divisive questions 
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about the ownership and management of major utilities.41 Thus, at the subsequent 
coroner’s inquest on 18 November 1852, whilst George Leather publicly admitted that 
he had received ‘repeated communications from the Overlookers that they had great 
difficulty in getting the Contractors to do their work according to the plans & 
specifications,’ he also insisted that ‘It was reported to me that the puddle Trenches 
were cut & footed in the manner shewn in the specifications.’42 Consequently, 
misinformation, coupled with operational failure, became the inside experts’ default 
explanation because it fell outside their control and thus rendered such accidents 
unpreventable in engineering parlance. As Turner notes, information difficulties and 
‘noise’ (that is, relevant information ‘buried in a mass of irrelevant material’) become 
defining factors when establishing reasons for failing to act during the incubation 
period.43 
The same can be said about administrative practice, another type of working 
knowledge recognised by urban historians, which relied on the experience and 
knowledge of the clerk in situ and not the engineer.44 Thus, whilst the HRC’s minutes 
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provide little evidence of dissatisfaction with Leather’s work, it is difficult to read too 
much into them prior to 1846 because significant omissions point to poor record-
keeping by the clerks.45 Resolutions went unrecorded, while committee business was 
recorded in an ad hoc fashion. A committee of management treated its legal 
responsibilities to manage the reservoirs in a lax fashion; the control of sluices, for 
instance, appears to have been left to those commissioners who resided closest to the 
reservoirs.46 In the commissioners’ order book only a single occasion is recorded 
when the clerk was ordered to write to Leather ‘to send a competent person over to 
examine and measure the work now done at the Bilberry Mill Reservoir and the state 
of the Works there with as little delay as possible.’47 There is no written evidence to 
prove that he did this, however, or that he received an official request to visit the 
works himself. In this regard, misinformation was hardly surprising given the absence 
of effective record-keeping. 
William Jacomb, who was appointed clerk in March 1846, confirmed this 
administrative laxity at the coroner’s inquest, noting that ‘there are no minutes of 
proceedings made by the Committee of Mr. Leather being appointed Engineer.’48 For 
two years before March 1840, Jacomb could find no significant entry relative to 
Bilberry; the construction delays and difficulties simply went unrecorded. Jacomb, a 
Huddersfield solicitor, was also agent to the Guardian Fire and Life Assurance 
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Company, the Family Endowment Society, and the West Riding Union Bank, and 
clearly understood the importance of organised record-keeping. As a well-connected 
member of the local social elite, Jacomb used his specialist administrative knowledge 
to cultivate a position of authority within the local community. His impact on the 
HRC’s management is immediately discernible: minutes record that he held meetings 
in his Huddersfield offices and systematically recorded business. He was also more 
actively involved than his predecessors in the management of the HRC’s affairs: for 
example, minutes record the opening of channels of communication with the 
millowners, ratepayers, mortgagees and engineers.49 By this stage, however, the HRC 
was insolvent and could not afford to carry out appropriate repairs to the leaking 
reservoir; Jacomb had been hired mainly to represent the body in its litigation against 
its creditors and mortgagees. Thus, the archival record reveals relevant details about 
organisational culture and practice, which contributed significantly towards failure, 
and is much more than an empirical record of decision and non-decision making.50 
 
Explaining ‘environmental’ disasters 
As we have seen, then, Turner’s work on disasters ascertains how the seeds of a 
socio-technological disaster are sown during its incubation period, in which a series of 
‘ambiguous or unnoticed events’ take place to alter ‘the notionally normal starting 
point.’ The environment plays a significant role in incubating a disaster, not least 
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because there is a discrepancy between ‘the environment as it had been believed to be, 
and the environment as it actually is.’51 More recently, Perrow reaffirms the role 
played by the environment in adding to the ‘interactional complexity’ of components 
of a socio-technical system, ‘since it impinges upon many parts or units in the 
system.’52 
In engineering practice, this meant that the environmental conditions that 
initially shaped the location of both reservoirs subsequently changed or were found to 
be different. As Harold Platt has shown, most knowledge about waterworks was 
acquired piecemeal through on-the-ground training, which included learning from 
mistakes: ‘Unprecedented in scale, the public works project became a source of both 
on-the-job education in hydraulic engineering and influential advances in waterworks 
technology.’53 Similarly, fire acts as a catalyst for changes in urban land use, building 
styles and materials, political regimes as well social and cultural attitudes towards risk, 
but this working knowledge is only ever acquired through the experience of 
conflagration.54 Consequently, both floods simultaneously point to incomplete 
exploratory research into the geological composition of the two reservoir sites, as well 
as evolving working knowledge about the environmental context in which they were 
both constructed. More popularly, environmental conditions served as useful lay 
explanations in a time of great uncertainty, as noted in the Sheffield and Rotherham 
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Independent’s editorial on that town’s flood: ‘Water, like fire, is a good servant but a 
bad master.’55 
Environmental factors were useful explanations for both Leathers and Gunson 
because they served to differentiate existing professional knowledge and practice 
from the unanticipated factors that caused accidents. Perrow’s work on complex 
interactions in socio-technologies, in which unexpected and unfamiliar sequences can 
occur, and which subsequently undermine system stability, further illustrates this 
point. As he writes, ‘linear interactions are those in expected and familiar production 
or maintenance sequence, and those that are quite visible even if unplanned,’ whereas 
complex interactions ‘are those of unfamiliar sequences, or unplanned and unexpected 
sequences, and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible.’56 Towlerton 
Leather and Gunson both argued that their post-disaster excavations of the Bradfield 
site revealed a landslip of ‘some hundred years ago’, which had likely undermined the 
puddle wall and allowed water seepage inside the embankment, thereby causing it to 
subside.57 They denied prior knowledge of this since the reservoir’s foundations had 
been sunk down to the sandstone bed, revealing no insurmountable problems. This 
explanation subsequently became the accepted narrative, especially for the SWWC’s 
directors who used it as justification for retaining monopoly control of Sheffield’s 
water supply as well as to service their expansion in forthcoming years, especially 
during the House of Lords’ debates over their proposed 1864 Bill for compensating 
the victims of the flood. There were, then, unanticipated interactions between the 
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technology and the environment that could not be blamed on their working practices, 
but were utilised in order to defend the organisational status quo.  
This is not to say that the engineers neglected the importance of environmental 
factors on their works; more so that the changeability of environmental conditions 
rendered it impossible to maintain complete control. Indeed, they stressed to the 
coroner that they had taken appropriate remedial safety measures: for instance, after 
the initial embankment had leaked, Gunson had moved the dam’s centre line further 
upstream and installed a bye-wash to provide an outlet for excess water following 
periods of heavy rainfall.58 For all their prudent risk management, they stressed that 
land slippages could not be fully planned out of the project because of their 
unpredictability. This was, Towlerton Leather insisted, a profession-wide immaturity, 
rather than the fault of a single engineer: ‘I did all that I thought necessary to provide 
against danger. I know of no means of providing against danger except the pipes and 
bye wash … There is a possibility of a landslip under the seat of the embankment 
having produced it, but that I cannot tell.’59 This further illustrates how engineers had 
to adapt their working knowledge to changing environmental conditions, yet they 
were unlikely to be in a position to do this so long as they were unable to anticipate 
the unanticipated. 
The fact is that few early reservoirs were designed with sufficient additional 
capacity for unforeseen heavy rainfall. Engineers based their knowledge on existing 
rainfall records, which were patchy and incomplete and, in the best cases, emergency 
flood defences only accommodated finite sources of water.60 Since knowledge about 
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the safety of new socio-technologies like waterworks was path-dependent, it is fair to 
surmise that George Leather and his companions also suffered from insufficient 
knowledge about the fault-lines in the vicinity of the Bilberry reservoir.61 In his 
testimony, George hinted that, since the original plans had not considered 
unanticipated heavy rainfall, the embankment would never have held firm anyway. 
Similar experiences elsewhere, notably at Manchester’s Woodhead Reservoir, which 
failed in 1849 owing to instability in the underlying rock, reinforced this view. The 
HRC never even consulted with an engineer on the actual siting of the dam; no 
exploratory test pits or trenches were dug.62 
As various studies have shown, the professionalisation and institutionalisation 
of the fields of science, technology and engineering during the nineteenth century was 
subject to considerable experimentalism and trial-and-error before rational knowledge 
could be agreed. It relied upon interacting with the socio-technology, observing and 
recording its operation under different environmental conditions. In a sense, then, 
socio-technological failure offered valuable lessons to the engineering profession in 
the best way to prevent future accidents. Specialist technical knowledge was also, as 
Roy Macleod and John Pickstone have shown, subject to administrative and 
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bureaucratic pressure; the forces of bureaucracy and professionalism were duly 
welded together in their acquisition of knowledge as both a making and a doing.63 
 
Experts on experts 
Despite its merits, Turner’s work has limitations, especially given the emergent 
interest in risk and uncertainty since the 1990s, which is also beginning to attract 
historical scrutiny.64 In particular, he underplays the language of disaster reporting 
and the role that this plays in a community’s cultural readjustment. More recent 
research, however, reveals how newspapers produce a variety of emotional and 
cathartic discourses through their coverage of disaster, ranging from horror to grief 
and anger.65 Indeed, one of the ways in which specialist knowledge could be 
publicised more widely was through its dissemination in the popular press; only then 
could generalists understand the finer technological details. Expertise may serve as a 
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way of distinguishing groups of individuals, but dissemination is integral to the 
process because it enables social and political elites, as well as the general public, to 
‘make decisions about who counts as an expert and who does not in … technological 
disputes in the public domain.’66 
In these two cases, media attention was most intensive locally, but both 
simultaneously attracted significant national focus, especially in their relief efforts. In 
Sheffield, the two main newspapers were divided along party lines when reporting on 
the causes of failure as well as their preferred solutions. The Tory-owned Sheffield 
Telegraph, published daily, was vocal in its opposition to both the SWWC’s attitude 
towards public safety and the town council’s toothless regulation, seizing the 
opportunity to push the agenda for the Anglican and steel manufacturing opposition 
on the council. Its editor, William Leng, publicly attacked the SWWC from the outset, 
declaring that ‘The Bradfield Dam was a mistake, or if not a mistake we should like to 
know what it was. It was made to perform a certain duty, and it has proved itself 
unequal to the duty.’67 Leng also reprinted articles from the professional press that 
were critical of the engineers, including an article from The Builder, which 
condemned Towlerton Leather for failing to install sluices to reduce the water level, 
and for his use of loose and porous materials in the puddle wall.68 The Sheffield and 
Rotherham Independent, another daily newspaper, distanced itself from publicly 
condemning the reservoir’s construction or management, largely because its editor, 
the Liberal Robert Leader, was a member of the relief committee alongside other 
members of the local elite, including the mayor and town clerk. 
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 Holmfirth lacked its own newspaper; instead, the Chronicle, published weekly 
in nearby Huddersfield, provided the most systematic coverage of its flood. As a 
result, criticism was more muted than in Sheffield; the newspaper too refused to 
‘indulge in comments either pro or con’ until the coroner’s inquiry had finished, 
preferring to ‘call attention to the very proper proceedings of the Coroner, in making 
Sir George Grey [the Home Secretary] acquainted with the facts, and in seeking for 
the assistance of a Government Engineer to examine and report upon the state of the 
reservoir.’69 Only after the coroner’s verdict of negligence on the part of the HRC did 
it print critical commentary, publishing a lengthy letter from Thomas Pearson 
Crosland, one of the commissioners, who, amongst other complaints, cited the failure 
of the overlookers to maintain public safety: 
 
It was not the business of the Commissioners to go personally and 
see that their orders were carried out. I charge the blame on the 
officials, by whose culpable neglect of duty a prosperous valley 
has been desolated, and an amount of human life sacrificed which 
is truly appalling to contemplate. There are the men who ought to 
have been subject to the verdict of the jury, and not men who were 
as innocent of sacrificing the lives of the inhabitants of the valley 
of the Holme as the jury themselves.70 
 
Crosland and others subsequently stressed the importance of rebuilding the broken 
dam for the local economy, shifting the debate away from ascribing blame onto more 
sympathetic issues that affected the newspaper’s readers.71 Newspapers served as 
alternative, sometimes conflicting, spaces within which knowledge claims could be 
made, challenged, resisted or tempered, particularly where political points could be 
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scored. They also reveal, as Turner recognised, the limitations in professional 
expertise, not least because engineers, with their specialised vocabulary, lacked the 
ability to connect with a generalist audience.72 This is significant because interactional 
experts depend on the support of generalists to evidence their claims to legitimacy. 
Thus, in failing to sustain popular support, the engineers in both cases faced public 
censure and de-legitimisation. 
In addition to this newspaper debate, public inquests were also held in both 
cases, drawing in the central government through the appointment of Home Office 
inspectors to provide a supposedly neutral account of events. As historians have 
shown, the second-half of the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of the government 
inspector as a new expert in information collection, supervision and certification. This 
was part of a broader shift from laissez-faire individualism to an interventionist 
approach by the state; it has also been interpreted as a method of liberal governmental 
rule from afar.73 In the case of post-disaster investigations, the appointment of 
government inspectors reflects an official recognition that a line has been crossed that 
requires action in order to assuage public concerns about safety. 
Government inspectors lacked the interactional ‘on-site’ expertise enjoyed by 
practising engineers, but they benefited from the bureaucratic authority that their 
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office-holding attached. They were, simultaneously, known to the engineers as 
members of the same professional networks, albeit normally as non-practising 
engineers. Yet they, more than any other generalist, could question the expertise and 
legitimacy of those whose interests were most directly affected by the events that 
unfolded because they understood the technology, even if they were not involved with 
building or managing it. As ‘conscious agents of change and perpetrators of state 
involvement,’ they influenced future policy-making in regulating such risks.74 
Moreover, their appointment secured a large and interested audience through their 
appearance at the inquests, but also via lengthy reports in newspapers: the 
Independent, for example, reported that Sir Robert Rawlinson, the Home Office’s 
Chief Engineering Inspector since 1861, was ‘listened to attentively’ during his 
testimony following his inspection of the disaster site.75 Inspectors were lauded as 
belonging to a class of ‘knowledgeable gentlemen amateurs’, whose evidence 
provided assurance to the public as much as criticism of the specialists. As Macleod 
notes, expertise was a quality possessed by administrators, professionals, generalists 
and specialists.76 The acquisition and practice of expertise thus became a defining tool 
of government regulation during the period, and was applied locally whenever 
circumstances allowed it. 
It would be simplistic to say that government inspectors were viewed as an 
unwelcome intrusion by officials keen to defend local autonomy from prying eyes. 
Indeed, within hours of the devastation in Holmfirth, the clerk to the Huddersfield 
magistrates wrote to Sir George Grey to ask for assistance in ascertaining the causes 
                                                 
74 R. Macleod, Introduction, in Macleod, ed, Government and Expertise, 18. 
75 Independent, 25 March 1864, 2-4. 
76 Macleod, Introduction, 14, 21. 
30 
of the flood. Similar letters were addressed by the clerk to the county court, the 
coroner and three presiding magistrates.77 Grey duly sent the Commanding Royal 
Engineer stationed at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Captain Richard Clement Moody, who 
accompanied the magistrates on a tour of the desolated valley before giving evidence 
to the public inquest.78 Sheffield’s town clerk and the borough coroner both wrote 
similar letters to Grey, now in his third term of office, the morning after their flood, 
again to request that ‘a Government Inspector be sent down to enquire into the Cause 
of this dreadful Catastrophe.’79 Grey again acquiesced, sending Rawlinson, 
accompanied by the hydrologist Nathaniel Beardmore, who represented the ICE. 
Their attention was particularly drawn to examine the safety of the SWWC’s other 
works in progress.80  
In both cases, the inspectors found fault with the original plans and their 
implementation, as well as the general management of both works. Moody censured 
the HRC for its ‘culpable neglect’, claiming that public safety might have been 
guaranteed ‘at the cost of a few Pounds.’ Its committee of management was singled 
out for blithely ignoring warnings about the safety of the reservoir. George Leather, 
too, came in for strong criticism, particularly for his lax supervision of the contractors: 
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Though the immediate cause of the destruction of life and property 
was the neglect of the Commissioners there were faults in the 
‘Design’ on the part of the Engineer, and great faults in the execution 
of that ‘design.’81 
 
Rawlinson and Beardmore recorded similar faults in their investigation, finding 
Towlerton Leather responsible for installing insufficient capacity to run off excess 
water.82 More seriously, both cases highlighted pressing concerns about the safety of 
neighbouring projects, themselves becoming objects for accelerated learning: Moody 
singled out the Holme Styes reservoir as a major cause for concern, and pressed the 
HRC to make urgent repairs.83 Rawlinson, meanwhile, warned that the Agden 
reservoir, which was under construction on the same principles as Dale Dyke, was 
unfit for purpose because it was ‘as porous as a sieve.’84 
Although the Holmfirth and Sheffield floods were local events – and have 
subsequently become part of those towns’ collective identities85 – the anxiety that 
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they generated nationwide indicates that they enjoyed a wider prominence that 
extended beyond the towns’ devastated environs. When, for example, Manchester 
Corporation controversially pursued plans to dam Lake Thirlmere in the Lake District, 
opponents drew on the memory of both floods as a warning of the dangers associated 
with ‘high artificial dams.’86  
The expertise attached to the detached inspector was, for many, a calming 
influence, prompting repeated requests from local MPs, officials and residents for the 
government to inspect other reservoirs, amidst inevitable fears about their safety. 
Moody subsequently visited Keighley, Huddersfield and Slaithwaite, all industrial 
towns in West Yorkshire, whereas Rawlinson’s attention was drawn to the 
embankment-reservoirs built for the worsted town of Bradford. He was also 
approached by frightened residents from the village of Thurlstone, which was situated 
half-way between the devastated Bilberry and Dale Dyke works, and who 
understandably lived in fear of the reservoir sited above their homes at Dunford 
Bridge: ‘this awful disaster at Sheffield has made us doubly anxious lest a similar 
calamity should befall us, & … we feel it our duty to call your attention to it in order 
that it may be officially examined.’87 In the weeks following the Sheffield flood, The 
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Times reported a ‘natural alarm for the safety of the numerous Reservoirs which may 
possibly be containing and maturing the elements of similar convulsions.’88  
As news of the floods spread across the urban-industrial north, the public’s 
interest in and fear of such disasters were given their own spatial and temporal 
dimensions. Prophetic safety warnings were deliberately phrased to force waterworks’ 
proprietors into action, as well as to prompt engineers to reconsider designs, but they 
equally brought public anxieties to the surface, which were political dynamite if left in 
inexpert hands. As Moody himself noted, tragedies like Holmfirth’s had proven that: 
 
Of all engineering works perhaps these when on a large scale 
demand more than any other that the design should be well 
considered and based on the safest principles. The most extreme 
care is required in carrying these designs into execution, and their 
subsequent management is also of the gravest importance. Faults 
under anyone of these heads whether from undue economy, 
ignorance, or neglect are certain of bringing about sooner or later 
the most serious results to the public.89 
 
Only with greater attention to risk would the adjacent communities also be able to 
enjoy the commercial benefits to be brought by impounding the water on their 
doorsteps. 
In addition to the government inspectors, other experienced engineers were 
involved in the post-disaster excavations. Worried about the Company’s likely 
backlash against Rawlinson and Beardmore’s findings, the members of Sheffield 
Town Council’s waterworks committee commissioned a further ‘independent’ inquiry 
from nine engineers, including such distinguished railway experts as Sir John Rennie 
and Charles Blacker Vignoles, as well as the pioneer of embankment-style storage 
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reservoirs, James Leslie from Edinburgh Waterworks, who similarly argued that the 
whole process was riddled with mistakes. Fuel was added to the fire when Rennie, 
past president of the ICE, advocated that important infrastructural projects like 
waterworks should be under municipal control: 
 
Considering the size of Sheffield, its growing importance, the 
general tendency of legislation on the subject, and the reciprocal 
connection between water supplies and drainage and other sanitary 
arrangements, it is my opinion that the Corporation ought to have 
possession of the water works.90 
 
Coming at a time when municipalities were branching out into the management of 
utilities like water and gas works, such comments were obviously intended to have 
political repercussions. During the 1850s and 1860s attitudes towards municipal 
ownership of water supplies had softened owing to longstanding fears about public 
health crises in industrial towns and a wider recognition that municipalities had the 
best interests of their residents at heart. Whereas private water companies had proven 
themselves useful at servicing industrial and commercial demand, as well as wealthy 
residential consumers, the public sector was more effective at extending service to 
poorer residential and commercial consumers, as well as in providing a more regular 
supply, including at night-time, which was important for other public services like 
fire-fighting. This, in turn, was advantageous for property values.91  
Rennie’s comments thus bolstered the arsenal of municipalities like Sheffield, 
which duly began a protracted and divisive drive to seize control of the SWWC’s 
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works, and which finally bore fruition in 1887. As historians have shown, heightened 
civic consciousness, aided by a nascent enterprising spirit and growing consumer 
dissatisfaction with the standard of existing amenities provided by commercial 
suppliers, fuelled the subsequent expansion of municipal control into water supplies. 
Disputes over the safety of large public works such as these obviously lent 
ammunition to the pro-municipal lobby.92 
 External expertise was not, however, solely limited to those intent on finding 
fault with the status quo. Waterworks’ proprietors were also obliged to seek the 
professional judgment of outside consultants, particularly where it could be harnessed 
as an ‘objective’ defence of their existing strategies. Most significant was the 
appearance in both cases of the well-known civil engineer, John Frederic la Trobe 
Bateman. The HRC first approached Bateman in March 1846 to seek his assistance 
with a private bill to raise funds for fixing its leaking reservoirs. Bateman inspected 
their works the following month; what he reported is unknown. In March 1852, one 
month after the flood, he re-inspected the Holme Styes and Boshaw Whams reservoirs, 
and advised the commissioners on the required repairs; he then succeeded George 
Leather as consulting engineer, which he juggled with his ongoing work for 
Manchester, as well as his work for Glasgow at Loch Katrine. His professional 
curiosity in taking on the Holmfirth works was partially triggered by concerns about 
the safety of the Longdendale works, particularly after landslides in that valley caused 
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one of his reservoirs to fail; it further illustrates how common-place it was for an 
engineer to accept multiple contracts, even following crises such as Holmforth’s.93 
The SWCC similarly consulted with Bateman during its early existence; his 
influence over the design plans was clearly discernible at Dale Dyke.94 In April 1864, 
timed to coincide with Rawlinson and Beardmore’s investigation, the Company’s 
directors commissioned Bateman, James Simpson (Chelsea Waterworks) and Thomas 
Hawksley (Nottingham Waterworks), as well as the railway embankment experts Sir 
John Fowler and Thomas Elliott Harrison, to investigate the Dale Dyke’s collapse. 
Unsurprisingly, since his attack questioned the standard model of reservoir 
construction, they disputed Rawlinson’s findings, finding that the Sheffield engineers 
had taken appropriate precautionary measures, and absolving them from any blame. 
In their report to the directors, the engineers concluded that the accident was caused 
neither by engineering or design fault, but by a landslip, ‘which occurred in the 
ground immediately on the east side of the embankment, and which extended beneath 
a portion of its outer slope, involving in its consequences the ruin of that portion of 
the bank, and producing the catastrophe which followed.’ They pointed to the 
physical scarring of the surrounding landscape, which had been fractured across a 
wide area, as well as cracks and other signs of subsidence in nearby cottages, as 
evidence of this.95  
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Strength in numbers worked: Towlerton Leather was exonerated from blame 
(though shortly thereafter replaced by Hawksley, who had supervised Nottingham’s 
Trent waterworks for some years, as the Company’s consulting engineer), while the 
Company maintained control over its enterprise. Despite various efforts, the Town 
Council did not gain control of the waterworks until 1887, after which it completed 
the Loxley works, which included a rebuilt and reinforced Dale Dyke. Although the 
Council publicly opposed the SWWC’s efforts, the House of Lords’ Select Committee 
on Private Bills believed the ‘official’ narrative, finding in favour of the Company’s 
1864 Bill to increase its water rates by twenty-five per cent in order to pay for repairs 
to Dale Dyke and compensate the victims. However, the Select Committee did at least 
add the proviso that the new lease would run for twenty-five years, which gave the 
Town Council sufficient time to ready itself to purchase the works.96 A similar, albeit 
startling, outcome at Holmfirth saw the HRC obtain sanction to draw the necessary 
capital to rebuild the dam from the surplus proceeds of the town’s relief fund on the 
grounds that the community’s reconstruction depended on it. The HRC was also 
granted permission to adjust its debts in order to enable them to maintain the works’ 
management.97 
This uneven transition to public control is unsurprising given that, as Thornton 
and Pearson have recently argued, ‘the fact that the vast majority of local authorities 
successfully took control of their local water undertakings during the period should 
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not be taken to mean that the process was always straightforward; multiple attempts 
were not uncommon and … it is surprising that so many purchase attempts 
succeeded.’98 It also demonstrates how slowly engineering knowledge evolved, even 
in the face of unanticipated accidents. Changing political attitudes towards the 
ownership of water utilities were, much like the prevailing laissez-faire orthodoxy of 
state intervention, even slower to take root. The market continued to exert a 
considerable influence over water policy, and this was aided and abetted by the inertia 
created by competing explanations of socio-technological failure. 
 
Conclusion 
The two case studies explored in this paper reveal the contestations that prevailed 
over the management of resources in supplying nineteenth-century urban 
communities with water. Knowledge about the design, construction and operation of 
socio-technologies like reservoirs was still largely in its infancy; knowledge was 
evolving with the lessons learned from each successive failure. With knowledge came 
expertise, which was a badge of status that was awarded to individual engineers as 
much as it reflected his cumulative experience. It was the product both of the 
piecemeal institutionalisation of professional knowledge and working practices, as 
well as of the cultural exchanges that occurred extraneous to these networks. An 
engineering family like the Leathers could still, then, be considered experts in their 
own field, yet derided as failures in wider cultural life. When, for example, the HRC 
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hired an engineer to inspect the safety of its reservoirs, including the rebuilt Bilberry, 
during the 1870s, it kept quiet about its choice, John Wignall Leather, so as not to 
reopen old sores.99 
Barry Turner’s work has proven useful in examining the historical incidence 
of socio-technological disasters. It is surprising, given its synchronic treatment of the 
relationship between the causality and outcome of disasters, that it has attracted such 
little historical interest. It reveals how such events were not ‘bolts from the blue’, 
however they may have been described by contemporaries; rather, they are the 
products of informational and organisational deficiencies. Moreover, by focusing on 
the similarities in the causes and outcomes of disasters, Turner established the value 
of comparative method as an important tool for disaster studies, especially in 
explaining the causal relationship between socio-technological systems, their wider 
environments and the human agents who design, build and operate them. The history 
of socio-technological disasters and other related crises can only really be understood 
from a multi-disciplinary perspective that draws on sociological explanations as much 
as empirical historical evidence. This paper, as well as other recent additions to the 
field, illustrates how integral the latter is to putting flesh on the conceptual bone.100 
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The combined historical and disaster studies literatures further reveal how 
socio-technological disasters are a consequence of the complex interaction of social, 
organisational and technical practices. Moreover, the role played by engineers in the 
occurrence of socio-technological failures, and the subsequent contestations 
surrounding their expertise, emerge as recurring features of post-disaster inquiry and 
investigation. This is discernible in the archival record, including the media, as well as 
public and private bodies at odds with one another. The case studies also reveal that 
socio-technological failures are manifested over time and are the product of 
incomplete and evolving knowledge and, therefore, expertise.  
Historical comparative analysis of the causal factors behind socio-
technological breakdown thus reveals the commonalities in the flaws that befell 
design, construction and operation. The collapse of the Bilberry and Dale Dyke 
reservoirs reveal more similarities than differences, from the mistakes made during 
the design and construction stages to the engineers’ defence of their working practices 
during the post-disaster inquiries. Both illustrate how specific ‘ways of knowing’ 
became entrenched within engineering practice and discourse; it subsequently proved 
difficult to challenge this agreed knowledge, especially once it had been designated 
and subsequently defended as a common feature of the profession’s interactional 
expertise. The barriers to change are notoriously difficult to overcome in the face of 
powerful and slowly evolving information and organisational practice. 
 Politicians’ failures to learn from the past come as no surprise to historians, 
who have long lamented their blinkered contemporary focus.101 Despite 
recommendations from their own inspectors and public calls for greater risk 
awareness in the aftermath of the Holmfirth and Sheffield floods, ministers resisted 
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calls for the central government to take on a supervisory function over reservoir safety 
because they feared the litigious consequences of governmental approval for projects 
that were later found to be defective. As Grey himself dourly warned, ‘the 
Government cannot undertake the inspection of all such Reservoirs at the public 
expence.’102 Instead, citing Holmfirth as a test case, the government forced all water-
works’ proprietors to accept liability for losses caused by the failure of any reservoir, 
embankment or watercourse.103  
Decades later, in 1925 when the Welsh mining village of Dolgarrog was 
inundated with flood waters from the privately-owned Eigiau Dam situated in the hills 
above, killing sixteen residents, similar questions were aired as at Holmfirth and 
Sheffield. Indeed, the Home Office re-examined the earlier floods in a vain attempt to 
finally learn from the repeated mistakes that were being made.104 After protracted soul 
searching and inter-departmental wrangling, the resulting legislation, the Reservoirs 
(Safety Provisions) Act, 1930, finally made it the legal duty of proprietors to have all 
large reservoirs periodically inspected by a qualified engineer before they could be 
certified as operational.105 By this date, the water engineers had formed their own 
representative institution, while the tide of municipalization had also lead to the 
establishment of the Institution of Municipal Engineers. For some engineers, however, 
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the Act did not go far enough – for example, it did little to improve the condition of 
existing reservoirs and did not cover all reservoirs – but it did at least put the engineer 
at the heart of the regulation process. The engineering profession, with its advanced 
associational network, would continue to supervise and regulate its own activities, but 
it was in a far stronger position to do so. 
 
  
 
 
 
